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Abstract
Secure communication over a wiretap channel is investigated, in which an active adversary modifies the state of the channel
and the legitimate transmitter has the opportunity to sense and learn the adversary’s actions. The adversary has the ability to switch
the channel state and observe the corresponding output at every channel use while the encoder has causal access to observations
that depend on the adversary’s actions. A joint learning/transmission scheme is developed in which the legitimate users learn
and adapt to the adversary’s actions. For some channel models, it is shown that the achievable rates, defined precisely for the
problem, are arbitrarily close to those obtained with hindsight, had the transmitter known the actions ahead of time. This initial
study suggests that there is much to exploit and gain in physical-layer security by learning the adversary, e.g., monitoring the
environment.
I. INTRODUCTION
The seminal papers of Wyner [2] and Csisza´r and Ko¨rner [3] on the wiretap channel have provided the foundation for advances
in information-theoretic secrecy. In more recent past, primarily motivated by the advent of wireless networks, a number of new
secure communication models have been studied leading to new design insights [4]. An example is the realization that secrecy
capacity in wireless channels with fading could be positive even with an eavesdropper obtaining a higher Signal-to-Noise Ratio
(SNR) than the legitimate receiver [5], [6]. Another example is the merits of introducing judicious interference, i.e., cooperative
jamming [7], and its ability to increase secrecy rates in multi-terminal settings [7], [8], [9], [10], [11]. Yet another example is
the ability to network with entities even if they are untrusted [12]. In all these initial studies, one critical assumption is that
the eavesdropper’s channel is completely or partially known to the legitimate parties. A second crucial assumption is that it
is a purely passive observer, is unable to make strategic decisions, or tamper with the channels in any way. More recently,
several studies have aimed at removing these assumptions or introducing new models that account for more powerful attacks.
To this end, a first direction addresses the wiretap model in which the eavesdropper’s channel is completely unknown and
can be varying. In this pessimistic set up, it has been shown in [13] that utilizing multiple antennas are useful in providing
secrecy, albeit with reduction in degrees of freedom as compared to the other extreme of completely known channels. A model
in which the adversary can modify its channel based on overheard signals has been addressed in the specific setting of a
two-way wiretap channel, utilizing cooperative jamming to counter the attack [14]. Additionally, the extensions of models to
active adversaries that can also jam the channel has been captured with arbitrarily-varying wiretap channel models, in which
both main and eavesdropper’s channels depend on states under complete control of the adversary. Secrecy rates for arbitrarily-
varying wiretap channels have been studied for point-to-point channels [15], [16], [17] and multiple-access channels [18],
leading to characterizations of situations in which secure communication is possible.
Another line of work has been towards addressing passive adversaries with strategic capabilities in their monitoring of
signals. These efforts build on the model known as wiretap channel Type II [19], in which the main channel is noiseless and
the eavesdropper has the ability to observe only a subset of the transmitted codeword bits with known size, but can choose the
subset it taps. This model imposes a more stringent secrecy constraint, requiring the wiretap codes to be universal with respect
to the choice of observed subset. Like [19], follow-up works that have generalized the wiretap II model beyond a noiseless
main channel [20], [21] have demonstrated that the effect of the adversary’s strategic ability is no worse than random erasures
of a subset of the same size. More recently, the secrecy capacity of a model that unifies the wiretap and wiretap II models has
been established in [22]. Some multi-terminal extensions of this model have been also been studied [23], [24].
Despite these successes, application of information-theoretic security in practical systems has not yet taken place. This is in
large part because the models to date include assumptions that are either extremely optimistic or perhaps overly pessimistic
with regards to what can be known about the adversary. The rationale behind the present paper is that there might be a middle
ground to develop adversarial yet realistic models. More precisely, we suggest that, although an adversary may potentially
control communication channels, its actions are likely to come at a cost, i.e., the modification may induce some physical effects
in the environment that can be detected by other parties. Thus, legitimate parties may have the ability to learn the adversary’s
actions and accordingly adapt their coding scheme. This idea is also motivated by several studies that have investigated the
role of feedback for reliable communication over arbitrary-varying channels [25], [26], [27] and have shown that the empirical
capacity of an arbitrary-varying channel can be achieved with negligible feedback.
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2As a first step towards integrating learning into information-theoretic secrecy models, we study here a wiretap channel model
in which an active adversary is able to attack the signals on the main channel by selecting one of two channels at every channel
use. Unlike previously studied models, we allow the transmitter to monitor the channel and causally receive a signal correlated
to the adversary’s observations. This consequently allows the legitimate parties to simultaneously “explore” the adversary’s
behavior and “exploit” it for providing secrecy. More concretely, our coding scheme chains the transmission of successive
sub-blocks to learn the adversary’s actions in past sub-blocks and causally generate secret keys from past observations. Secure
communication is achieved by superposing the transmission of uniform random bits and one-time-padded message bits through
a suitably generalized layered-secrecy coding scheme [28]. To ensure reliability in the presence of an attacker actively tampering
with the main channel, which was not considered in our preliminary results [1], our coding scheme also leverages a universal
list-decoder chained over sub-blocks. We emphasize that key generation is the crucial building block that enables learning for
secrecy, by allowing our coding scheme to defer the decisions as to which bits are secret until after the adversary’s actions
have been learned. We also point out that the greater flexibility offered by key generation compared to direct wiretap coding
can be traced back to earlier works but for completely different models and without any connection to learning. For instance,
key generation has been used [5], [29] in fading channels as a means to buffer secret keys and provision secrecy.
Perhaps surprisingly, we show that the legitimate parties achieve the secrecy rates that they would have obtained with
hindsight, had they known the attacker’s actions non-causally. This result is conceptually similar to those that exist in the
context of multi-arm bandit problems [30]: without knowing the adversary’s actions a priori, one can simultaneously exploit
and explore to develop an asymptotically optimal strategy. This connection is not fortuitous, as our proof extends ideas laid out
in the context of universal channel and source coding [31], [26] that make explicit use of reinforcement learning. In particular,
our definition of rate is similar to [26], in which the number of bits required to be decoded correctly is only specified at the
end of the transmission, and our converse proof follows the same approach as in [26].
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we introduce the model under investigation. In Section III,
which constitutes the core of our contribution, we develop an achievability proof based on the coding scheme outlined earlier.
In Section IV, we establish a converse that matches our achievability. In Section V, we conclude with a discussion of natural
extensions of our model.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION AND MAIN RESULTS
A. Notation
We denote random variables by uppercase letters (e.g., X), their realizations by lowercase letters (e.g., x), sets by calligraphic
letters (e.g., X ), and vectors by bold face letters (e.g., x). For x = (x1, · · · , xn) ∈ Xn and a ∈ X , let N(x|a) , |{i : xi = a}|.
For x ∈ {0, 1}n, let wt(x) , N(x|1) and α(x) , wt(x)n . If PX is a Probability Mass Function (PMF) over X , let TPX , {x ∈Xn : for all a ∈ X : N(x|a) = P (a)n}. We denote by Pn(X ) the set of all PMFs PX for which TPX 6= ∅ and by Pn(X|Y) the
set of all conditional PMFs PX|Y for which there exists a joint PMF PXY such that PX|Y = PXYPY and TPXY 6= 0. For x ∈ Xn
and a conditional PMF PY |X , we also define TPY |X (x) , {y ∈ Yn : for all a ∈ X , b ∈ Y : N(x,y|a, b) = PY |X(b|a)N(x|a)}.
For three discrete random variables (X,Y, Z) with joint PMF PXY Z , we define
PX|Y Z ◦ PZ ,
∑
z
PX|Y Z=zPZ(z) , PX|Y (1)
PZ|Y × PX|Y Z , PZ|Y PX|Y Z , PXZ|Y (2)
I(PX , PY |X) , I(PXY ) , I(X;Y ). (3)
For two sequences x ∈ Xn and y ∈ Yn such that (x,y) ∈ TPXY , we define
I(x ∧ y) , I(PXY ). (4)
For two integers a and b such that a 6 b, we denote the set {a, a + 1, · · · , b − 1, b} by Ja, bK. If a > b, then Ja, bK , ∅.
Throughout the paper, we measure the information in bits and log(·) should be understood to be base 2; we use ln(·) for the
logarithm base e.
B. Problem Formulation and Main Results
We consider the channel model illustrated in Figure 1, in which a transmitter wishes to communicate securely to a receiver
over N channel uses of an arbitrarily varying wiretap Discrete Memoryless Channel (DMC) (X × S,WY Z|XS ,Y,Z). We
assume that the capacity with common randomness of the arbitrarily varying channel (X ×S,WY |XS ,Y) is positive, otherwise
it will be impossible to send any information reliably over this channel. The terminals corresponding to Y and Z are in control
of the legitimate receiver and the adversary, respectively. The adversary is allowed to actively and arbitrarily choose the state
of the channel S at each channel use. The transmitter and the receiver may share secret randomness prior to the transmission
whose amount will be made precise. For simplicity, we suppose S = {0, 1}; however, generalizing our results to arbitrary
finite S is fairly direct, and we discuss this extension in Section V. We assume that the transmitter is able to monitor the
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Fig. 1. Problem setup
effect of the adversary’s actions, which we model as strictly causal observations at the output of an arbitrarily varying DMC
(X × S,WX|XS ,X ) controlled by the same states as the main wiretap channel. Our only assumption for this channel is that
WX|XS=0 6= WX|XS=1, as otherwise the model reduces to an arbitrarily varying wiretap channel [32]. We assume that all
channel outputs are conditionally independent given the input and that the statistical description of the channels are known to
all parties. As discussed in Remark 2 below, we rely on these assumptions for our converse proof, but they play no crucial role
in the achievability. The transmitted sequence is denoted by X , (X1, · · · , XN ), while the corresponding observations of the
receiver and the adversary are denoted by Y , (Y1, · · · , YN ) and Z , (Z1, · · · , ZN ), respectively. The monitored sequence
is X , (X1, · · · , XN ).
Formally, a code for this channel model operates as follows. Unlike traditional wiretap channel models, the number of
message bits is unknown at the beginning of transmission and potentially depends on the adversary’s actions. Therefore, it is
convenient to assume that the transmitter has access to K uniformly distributed bits W , (W1, · · · ,WK), and that only the
first ψ bits will be transmitted1. Both the encoder and the decoder also have access to a secret common randomness source
Q distributed according to PQ over Q. The encoder consists of N possibly stochastic functions f = (f1, · · · , fN ) where
fi : X i−1 × {0, 1}K × Q → X outputs a symbol for the transmission over the channel. The total number of transmitted
bits ψ : XN × Q → J0,KK is a function of the transmitter’s observations and is determined after the N th transmission. The
decoder is a function φ : YN ×Q → {0, 1}K , which allows the receiver to form an estimate (Ŵ1, · · · , ŴK) , φ(Y, Q) of the
transmitted bits. Since the channel is varying according to the adversary’s actions, the receiver is not required to reliably decode
all bits. We assume that there exists a function ψ̂ : YN ×Q → J0,KK that estimates the number of bits actually transmitted.
The quintuple (f , φ, ψ, ψ̂,Q) defines an (N,K) code C, and the functions f , φ, ψ, and ψ̂ are assumed to be publicly known.
For all s ∈ SN , reliability is measured with a probability of error defined as
Pe(C|s) , P
(
ψ̂(Y, Q) 6= ψ(X, Q) or ∃k ∈ J1, ψ̂(Y, Q)K : Ŵk 6= Wk∣∣s). (5)
Secrecy is measured in terms of the average mutual information between the message bits W and the observations Z given s
as
S(C|s) , I(W;Z|s). (6)
The rate of the code is a function of the adversary’s actions and is a random variable defined as ψ(X,Q)n . Furthermore, for
a fixed value of common randomness q ∈ Q, we define Pe(C|s, q) and S(C|s, q) analogously using probability distributions
conditioned on Q = q.
Definition 1. For a fixed sequence {sN ∈ SN}N>1 of adversarial actions, a sequence of (N,KN ) codes {CN = (fN , φN , ψN , ψ̂N , QN )}N>1








S(CN |sN ) = 0, (8)
lim
N→∞











1Despite conceptual similarities with layered secrecy coding [28], our problem formulation is different for technical reasons.
4Remark 1. The number of secret bits transmitted depends on the noisy observations X of the adversary’s actions and on
the common randomness QN , both of which are random variables. Consequently, the number of secret bits is itself a random
variable and our notion of achievable rate in (10) only requires a rate R to be achieved with high probability.
Remark 2. The technical assumptions behind our model have concrete operational significance. Since ψ is publicly known,
no secrecy is conveyed through the number of secret bits. Since only the transmitter monitors the environment, the receiver
does not benefit from another channel observation that could potentially increase its reliability. Finally, since channel outputs
are conditionally independent given the input, the transmitter only obtains information about the adversary’s actions and not
about the receiver or adversary’s actions. These assumptions are not crucial in our achievability proof but they are needed in
the converse.
For α ∈ [0, 1], let PS be Bernoulli(α) over S and C(α) , supPXU (I(U ;Y )− I(U ;Z|S)) where the random variables
(U,X, S, Y, Z) have joint PMF PUXPSWY Z|XS . Our main results are as follows.
Theorem 1 (Achievability). For any ζ > 0, there exists a sequence of (N,KN ) codes {CN}N>1 that achieves the rate C(α)−ζ
for all α ∈]0, 1[ and every sequence {sN ∈ {0, 1}N}N>1 with limN→∞ α(sN ) = α.
Theorem 2 (Converse). If a sequence of (N,KN ) codes {CN}N>1 achieves a rate R for all sequences {sN}N>1 with
limn→∞ α(sN ) = α, then R 6 C(α).
We prove Theorem 1 in Section III and Theorem 2 in Section IV. Note that the main contribution of the theorem is in
guaranteeing the existence of codes having good performance for all choices of s. If the maximum weight of the actions
sequence wt(sN ) were known, the achievability would follow from [22].
Remark 3. Without constraints on the adversary’s actions, one might wonder why the adversary would not always choose
the “best” action over all N channel uses, so that the problem would reduce to a traditional wiretap channel. Our modeling
allows us to remove all assumptions regarding the rationality or possible limitations of the adversary that the legitimate parties
could be unaware of. Our scheme performs optimally as if these constraints were known a priori.
Remark 4. In both achievability and converse, if limN→∞ α(sN ) does not exist, we need to consider the sub-sequence of








is minimized. This subtlety is a consequence of our asymptotic formulation of the rate, and one should note that our achievability
scheme provides guarantees at finite length.
III. PROOF OF THEOREM 1: ACHIEVABILITY SCHEME
We have organized our achievability proof in distinct steps that we present in Sections III-A to III-F. For the reader’s
convenience, we highlight here the high-level conceptual ideas behind our proof.
• In Section III-A, we develop the first building block of our coding scheme in the form of a generalized layered-secrecy
code [28]; specifically, we show super-exponential concentration (Lemma 1) and universality of the layered-secrecy code
with respect to all state sequences with a known weight (Lemma 2).
• In Section III-B, we design the second building block of our coding scheme in the form of a suitably modified universal
list-decoder [33]. Specifically, we establish an upper-bound on the performance of a universal list decoder with respect
to all state sequences with a known weight (Lemma 3 and Lemma 4).
• In Section III-C, we develop an adaptive coding scheme exploiting the previously developed building block under two
simplifying assumptions: we assume the existence of an oracle that may provide the transmitter and the receiver with the
exact weight of the attacker’s past action sequence; we also assume that the transmitter and receiver have access to an
unlimited amount of common randomness. Our adaptive coding scheme then operates over a chain of consecutive blocks
to adapts to the attacker’s actions and offers secrecy and reliability regardless of the actions (Lemma 6 and Corollary 1).
• In Section III-D, we show how to replace the oracle by an actual noisy estimator of the attacker’s past action sequence
without affecting asymptotic performance (Corollary 2).
• In Section III-E, we show how the input distribution underlying the construction of the layered-secrecy code may be
adapted from one block to another.
• Finally, in Section III-F, we finally show how to reduce the randomness in the randomized scheme (Lemma 10) to achieve
similar performance with a negligible rate of common randomness (Lemma 10).
A. First Building Block: Layered-Secrecy Coding
We first derive a super-exponential bound for the probability that a randomly chosen code is not secure for the adversary’s
channel; such bounds have already been used to prove the achievability for the wiretap channel Type II [17], [22], and we
5provide here an alternative proof that relies on upper-bounding the mutual information by an average of KL-divergence terms.
This approach simplifies the argument and may be of independent interest.
We first establish our results in a one-shot setup and then extend them to n channel uses. Consider K independent bits
W = (W1, · · · ,WK) that are encoded through an encoder f : {0, 1}K → X and assume that the codeword f(W) is transmitted
over the channel (X ,WZ|X ,Z). We let L(f,m) , I(W1, · · · ,Wm;Z) denote the information leaked about the first m bits of
the message using the encoder f . The following lemma establishes bounds for the leakage obtained with random codes.
Lemma 1. Suppose F : {0, 1}K → X is a random encoder such that {F (w) : w ∈ {0, 1}K} are independent and identically















Then, for all γ, 0 <  < 1, and η′ > η(γ),
EF (L(F,m)) 6 η′, and P(L(F,m) > (1 + )η′) 6 2
− 2m2η′
2 ln 2 log 1
µZ . (13)
Proof. The first inequality in (13) follows from standard channel resolvability results [34], [35], but for completeness, we
provide the proof here using our notation. Let P̂W1···WmZ denote the PMF of (W1, · · · ,Wm, Z) for a particular realization of
the encoder F . Notice that





















Additionally, for a fixed w1, · · · , wm,





WZ|X(z|f(w1, · · · , wK)), (18)






















To obtain (13), we show that the expression in (17) is sum of independent random variables so that we can use Cher-




depends on the codewords corresponding to indices
{(w1, · · · , wm, wm+1, · · · , wK) : (wm+1, · · · , wK) ∈ {0, 1}K−m}, and for distinct w1, · · · , wm, these sets are disjoint. Since





: (w1, · · · , wm) ∈ {0, 1}m
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P̂Z|W1,··· ,Wm(z|w1, · · · , wm) log













Thus, [37, Lemma LD] implies that

















2 ln 2 log 1µZ
)
. (26)
6Consider now an arbitrarily varying DMC (X × S,WZ|XS ,Z) with S = {0, 1} and a PMF PX over X . Assume that
K random bits W , (W1, · · · ,WK) encoded by a random encoder F : {0, 1}K → Xn whose codewords are generated
i.i.d. according to P ⊗nX and transmitted over n channel uses. Let s = (s1, · · · , sn) be a sequence of channel states, and
L(F,m|s) , I(W1, · · ·Wm;Z|s) be the information leakage about the first m bits given the state sequence s. For IαZ ,
(1 − α)I(PX ,WZ|XS=0) + αI(PX ,WZ|XS=1) for α ∈ [0, 1], our objective is to show that for all choices of s, almost
K − Iα(s)Z n bits are transmitted secretly.







exists ξ > 0 such that for large n,
PF
(
for all s ∈ Sn, L(F,m(s)|s) 6 2−nξ) > 1− 2−2nξ . (27)
Proof. For a fixed s ∈ Sn, to apply Lemma 1, let (X,Z) be distributed according to ∏ni=1 (PX ×WZ|XS=si), PZ|S=s ,







∣∣∣∣log WZ|XS(z|xs)PZ|S(z|s) − I(PX ,WZ|XS=s)
∣∣∣∣ , (28)


































Further, by definition of m(s) and γ,
2−K+m(s)+γ+1 = 2−K+K−d(I
α
Z+ζ)ne+(IαZ+ 12 ζ)n+1 (32)
6 2− 12 ζn+1. (33)























, for large enough n, η(γ) 6 232−ξn , η′. Thus, with  =
1


















12 ln(2)n log 1µZ
)
. (36)
As a result, by the union bound,
PF
(









12 ln(2)n log 1µZ
)
. (38)





12 ln(2)n log 1µZ
)
6 2−2ξn . (39)
Lemma 2 therefore shows the universality of layered secrecy coding with respect to the state sequence s.
7B. Second Building Block: Universal List Decoding
In this section, we introduce the main tool we utilize to tackle the challenge of coding for a channel with varying statistics.
We divide the transmission into sub-blocks and allow the decoder to output a list of possible messages such that the transmitted
message is in the list with high probability. In addition, the encoder injects specific structures into the messages so that the
decoder can uniquely determine the actual messages sent. Feedback plays a key role in our scheme since the added structure
depends on the causal information the encoder has about the channel states. We develop the needed universal list decoding
scheme by relying on the results of [33]. However, unlike [33] in which the channel is assumed to be fixed during the
transmission, we allow the statistics of the channel to vary and consider an arbitrary varying channel (AVC) that is controlled
by a sequence of states. To formalize this argument, we define a one-shot code with list decoder and introduce a generic
universal list decoder.
Definition 2. For a channel (X ,WY |X ,Y), an (M,L, ) list code C is a pair of encoder/decoder (f, φ) with f : J1,MK→ X
and φ = (φ1, · · · , φL) : Y → J1,MKL satisfying







WY |X(y|f(w))1{for all i ∈ J1, LK φi(y) 6= w} 6 . (40)
Furthermore, for a given function ν : X × Y → R, an encoder f : J1,MK → X , and L ∈ J1,MK, we define a universal list
decoder φ[ν, f, L] : Y → J1,MKL as





In other words, φ[ν, f, L](y) outputs the L distinct indices in J1,MK with the largest ν(f(·), y).
Let (X ,WY |X ,Y) be a channel, and PX be a distribution over X . If F : J1,MK → X is a random encoder such that
F (1), · · · , F (M) are i.i.d. according to PX , the following lemma upper-bounds the expected value of the probability of error
for the random list code.
Lemma 3. For any function ν : X × Y → R,
EF
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where q(x, y) ,
∑
x˜ PX(x˜)1{ν(x, y) 6 ν(x˜, y)} = PPX (ν(X, y) > ν(x, y)).
Proof. Using the definition of probability of error and the symmetry of the messages, we have
EF
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{∃w′′1 < · · · < w′′L : ∀i ∈ J1, LK ν(xw′′i , y) > ν(x, y)} . (43)





{∃w′′1 < · · · < w′′L : ∀i ∈ J1, LK ν(xw′′i , y) > ν(x, y)} = P(B(x, y) > L). (44)
Following the same steps as in [33], we obtain
















and the result follows by substituting (46) into (43).






For a positive integer M and a PMF PX over X , we define a random encoder F : J1,MK→ Xn for which every codeword is
sampled independently according to P ⊗nX , and we set ν : Xn ×Yn → R as ν(x,y) , I(x∧ y) the mutual information of the
joint type of x and y. Then, for a fixed L, the decoder Φ , φ[ν, F, L] is well-defined. For all s ∈ Sn, the following lemma
upper-bounds the expected value of the probability of error of the aforementioned random code.
Lemma 4. For s ∈ Sn, let (X,Y, S) be three random variables distributed according to PXY S(x, y, s) = PX(x)PS(s)WY |XS(y|xs),











In particular, for all ζ > 0, there exists ξ > 0 such that for all s, if 1n log
M


























P ⊗nX (x˜)1{I(x ∧ y) 6 I(x˜ ∧ y)} . (51)








P ⊗nX (TQ˜X|Y (y))1
{







2−nD(Q˜X|Y ‖PX |QY )1
{




6 (n+ 1)|X ||Y|2
−n
(
minQ˜X|Y :I(QY ,QX|Y )6I(QY ,Q˜X|Y )
D(Q˜X|Y ‖PX |QY )
)
(55)
= (n+ 1)|X ||Y|2
−n
(
minQ˜X|Y :I(QY ,QX|Y )6I(QY ,Q˜X|Y )
I(QY ,Q˜X|Y )+D(Q˜X|Y ◦QY ‖PX)
)
(56)




where (a) follows from [38, Equation 2.8], and (b) follows from |Pn(X|Y)| 6 (n+ 1)|X ||Y|. Hence, we obtain
∑
x,y


















































where (a) follows since log |Pn(X × Y|S)| = O(log n). This completes the proof of (48).








VXY |S‖W × PX |PS
)








Otherwise, we have I(VXY |S ◦ PS)− 1n log eML 6 12ζ. Recall that 1n log ML = I(X;Y )− ζ, and as a result,
I(VXY |S ◦ PS)− log e
n
− I(X;Y ) + ζ 6 1
2
ζ. (61)
Note that I(X;Y ) = I((PX ×WY |XS) ◦ PS). Thus, for large enough n,
I(VXY |S ◦ PS)− I((WY |XS × PX) ◦ PS) 6 −1
3
ζ. (62)
By the continuity of mutual information, we know that there exists  > 0 such that
V
(
VXY |S ◦ PS , (WY |XS × PX) ◦ PS
)
> . (63)
Moreover, this  can be chosen independent of PS . Applying Pinsker’s inequality, we obtain
D
(
VXY |S ◦ PS‖(WY |XS × PX) ◦ PS
)
> 2. (64)
Finally, by the convexity of KL-divergence, we conclude that
D
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C. Oracle-Assisted Coding Scheme with Arbitrary Common Randomness
In this section, we develop a coding scheme based on two simplifying assumptions; we assume that there exists an oracle
providing partial causal information about the channel states to both the transmitter and the receiver, and that the legitimate
parties have access to an arbitrary large source of common randomness. Proper estimators are introduced in Section III-D to
replace the oracle, and Ahlswede’s robustification technique [39] is used in Section III-F to reduce the amount of common
randomness.
Our coding scheme, which is illustrated in Figure 2, is an (N,K) oracle-assisted coding scheme that consists of a transmission
over B sub-blocks of length n and one terminal sub-block whose length will be specified later. We denote all quantities
corresponding to the sub-block b by a superscript b; specifically, sb denotes the channel states sequence in sub-block b. The
oracle is assumed to provide wt(sb) to the legitimate parties at the end of the sub-block b. Intuitively, the scheme operates
as follows. In every sub-block b, we transmit k uniform random bits Ab = (Ab1, · · · , Abk) that do not convey information
on their own using a layered secrecy scheme [28]; in the next sub-block, the number of secure bits is evaluated using the
oracle information, and those bits are used as a key to one-time-pad information bits in the next sub-block b+ 1. The use of
uniform random bits and a layered transmission scheme is crucial to enable the extraction of secrecy with hindsight. Since the
capacity of the main channel depends on the channel states, the decoder outputs a list of possible values for Ab with a list size
determined by α(sb). To be able to decode the messages uniquely, the transmitter adds further structure to the transmitted bits
by repeating some of the bits of the sub-block b in the sub-block b+ 1. We call such a scheme an (N,K, n) oracle assisted
scheme, and the formal description of the coding scheme is as follows.
Message Set: For all b ∈ J1, BK and κ ∈ J1, kK, let W bκ and Lbκ be random bits uniformly distributed on {0, 1}; all these
random variables are mutually independent. Furthermore, for all (κ, b) ∈ J1, kK× J1, BK, we assume that W bκ contains useful
information but Lbκ is just an auxiliary bit.
Encoding: Fix a distribution over X , PX , and ζ > 0. For α ∈ [0, 1], define
IαY = I
(
PX , (1− α)WY |XS=0 + αWY |XS=1
)
(67)




ImaxZ = max(I0Z , I1Z) (70)
Imax = max(ImaxY , ImaxZ ). (71)
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<latexit sha1_base64="5ezcE PG+5dJC4UHuF4jGF5C2CSw=">AAACY3icbVDbihNBEO2MtzXrJbv 6JsJgFASXzIwICr6s+OKDDytsdgNJDDWVmqTZvgzdNUvCMH/iq/6 TH+B/2JPkwd21oIvDqVOXPnmppOc0/d2Jbt2+c/fe3v3u/oOHjx7 3Dg7PvK0c0hCtsm6UgyclDQ1ZsqJR6Qh0rug8v/jc1s8vyXlpzSmv S5pqWBhZSAQO1KzXm2jgZV7Un5rvdf4ma2a9fjpINxHfBNkO9MUu TmYHnY+TucVKk2FU4P04S0ue1uBYoqKmO6k8lYAXsKBxgAY0+Wm9 Ob2JXwVmHhfWhWc43rD/dtSgvV/rPCjbQ/31Wkseedbg1m7+P9G4 4uLDtJamrJgMbjcWlYrZxq0h8Vw6QlbrAACdDEfHuAQHyMG2K+va2 SXr1dHCQbmUuAp/28ytk6EP4iS4bnGZfIVTGiVMq0RBm8Gh1ds8K yqDrfN+ECpNtxvszq6bexOcvR1k6SD79q5//HJn/J54Jl6I1yIT7 8Wx+CJOxFCguBQ/xE/xq/Mn2o8Oo6dbadTZ9TwRVyJ6/hcXjLlH</ latexit><latexit sha1_base64="5ezcE PG+5dJC4UHuF4jGF5C2CSw=">AAACY3icbVDbihNBEO2MtzXrJbv 6JsJgFASXzIwICr6s+OKDDytsdgNJDDWVmqTZvgzdNUvCMH/iq/6 TH+B/2JPkwd21oIvDqVOXPnmppOc0/d2Jbt2+c/fe3v3u/oOHjx7 3Dg7PvK0c0hCtsm6UgyclDQ1ZsqJR6Qh0rug8v/jc1s8vyXlpzSmv S5pqWBhZSAQO1KzXm2jgZV7Un5rvdf4ma2a9fjpINxHfBNkO9MUu TmYHnY+TucVKk2FU4P04S0ue1uBYoqKmO6k8lYAXsKBxgAY0+Wm9 Ob2JXwVmHhfWhWc43rD/dtSgvV/rPCjbQ/31Wkseedbg1m7+P9G4 4uLDtJamrJgMbjcWlYrZxq0h8Vw6QlbrAACdDEfHuAQHyMG2K+va2 SXr1dHCQbmUuAp/28ytk6EP4iS4bnGZfIVTGiVMq0RBm8Gh1ds8K yqDrfN+ECpNtxvszq6bexOcvR1k6SD79q5//HJn/J54Jl6I1yIT7 8Wx+CJOxFCguBQ/xE/xq/Mn2o8Oo6dbadTZ9TwRVyJ6/hcXjLlH</ latexit><latexit sha1_base64="5ezcE PG+5dJC4UHuF4jGF5C2CSw=">AAACY3icbVDbihNBEO2MtzXrJbv 6JsJgFASXzIwICr6s+OKDDytsdgNJDDWVmqTZvgzdNUvCMH/iq/6 TH+B/2JPkwd21oIvDqVOXPnmppOc0/d2Jbt2+c/fe3v3u/oOHjx7 3Dg7PvK0c0hCtsm6UgyclDQ1ZsqJR6Qh0rug8v/jc1s8vyXlpzSmv S5pqWBhZSAQO1KzXm2jgZV7Un5rvdf4ma2a9fjpINxHfBNkO9MUu TmYHnY+TucVKk2FU4P04S0ue1uBYoqKmO6k8lYAXsKBxgAY0+Wm9 Ob2JXwVmHhfWhWc43rD/dtSgvV/rPCjbQ/31Wkseedbg1m7+P9G4 4uLDtJamrJgMbjcWlYrZxq0h8Vw6QlbrAACdDEfHuAQHyMG2K+va2 SXr1dHCQbmUuAp/28ytk6EP4iS4bnGZfIVTGiVMq0RBm8Gh1ds8K yqDrfN+ECpNtxvszq6bexOcvR1k6SD79q5//HJn/J54Jl6I1yIT7 8Wx+CJOxFCguBQ/xE/xq/Mn2o8Oo6dbadTZ9TwRVyJ6/hcXjLlH</ latexit><latexit sha1_base64="5ezcE PG+5dJC4UHuF4jGF5C2CSw=">AAACY3icbVDbihNBEO2MtzXrJbv 6JsJgFASXzIwICr6s+OKDDytsdgNJDDWVmqTZvgzdNUvCMH/iq/6 TH+B/2JPkwd21oIvDqVOXPnmppOc0/d2Jbt2+c/fe3v3u/oOHjx7 3Dg7PvK0c0hCtsm6UgyclDQ1ZsqJR6Qh0rug8v/jc1s8vyXlpzSmv S5pqWBhZSAQO1KzXm2jgZV7Un5rvdf4ma2a9fjpINxHfBNkO9MUu TmYHnY+TucVKk2FU4P04S0ue1uBYoqKmO6k8lYAXsKBxgAY0+Wm9 Ob2JXwVmHhfWhWc43rD/dtSgvV/rPCjbQ/31Wkseedbg1m7+P9G4 4uLDtJamrJgMbjcWlYrZxq0h8Vw6QlbrAACdDEfHuAQHyMG2K+va2 SXr1dHCQbmUuAp/28ytk6EP4iS4bnGZfIVTGiVMq0RBm8Gh1ds8K yqDrfN+ECpNtxvszq6bexOcvR1k6SD79q5//HJn/J54Jl6I1yIT7 8Wx+CJOxFCguBQ/xE/xq/Mn2o8Oo6dbadTZ9TwRVyJ6/hcXjLlH</ latexit>
Ab 1
<latexit sha1_ base64="REyTb+/HkBMeGjVCLx VODiQY2Cc=">AAACY3icbVDJbh NBEG0PW3BYnMANIY0wSByCZwYh gcQliAsHDkGKE0u2sWrKNXYrvY y6ayJbo/kTrvBPfAD/QY/tA0ko qUtPr14t/fJSSc9p+rsT3bp95+ 69vfvd/QcPHz3uHRyeeVs5pCFa Zd0oB09KGhqyZEWj0hHoXNF5fvG 5rZ9fkvPSmlNelzTVsDCykAgcq FmvN9HAy7yoPzXf6/xN1sx6/XS QbiK+CbId6ItdnMwOOh8nc4uVJ sOowPtxlpY8rcGxREVNd1J5KgE vYEHjAA1o8tN6c3oTvwrMPC6sC 89wvGH/7ahBe7/WeVC2h/rrtZY 88qzBrd38f6JxxcWHaS1NWTEZ3G 4sKhWzjVtD4rl0hKzWAQA6GY6O cQkOkINtV9a1s0vWq6OFg3IpcR X+tplbJ0MfxElw3eIy+QqnNEqY VomCNoNDq7d5VlQGW+f9IFSabj fYnV039yY4ezvI0kH27V3/+OXO +D3xTLwQr0Um3otj8UWciKFAcS l+iJ/iV+dPtB8dRk+30qiz63ki rkT0/C8bbLlJ</latexit><latexit sha1_ base64="REyTb+/HkBMeGjVCLx VODiQY2Cc=">AAACY3icbVDJbh NBEG0PW3BYnMANIY0wSByCZwYh gcQliAsHDkGKE0u2sWrKNXYrvY y6ayJbo/kTrvBPfAD/QY/tA0ko qUtPr14t/fJSSc9p+rsT3bp95+ 69vfvd/QcPHz3uHRyeeVs5pCFa Zd0oB09KGhqyZEWj0hHoXNF5fvG 5rZ9fkvPSmlNelzTVsDCykAgcq FmvN9HAy7yoPzXf6/xN1sx6/XS QbiK+CbId6ItdnMwOOh8nc4uVJ sOowPtxlpY8rcGxREVNd1J5KgE vYEHjAA1o8tN6c3oTvwrMPC6sC 89wvGH/7ahBe7/WeVC2h/rrtZY 88qzBrd38f6JxxcWHaS1NWTEZ3G 4sKhWzjVtD4rl0hKzWAQA6GY6O cQkOkINtV9a1s0vWq6OFg3IpcR X+tplbJ0MfxElw3eIy+QqnNEqY VomCNoNDq7d5VlQGW+f9IFSabj fYnV039yY4ezvI0kH27V3/+OXO +D3xTLwQr0Um3otj8UWciKFAcS l+iJ/iV+dPtB8dRk+30qiz63ki rkT0/C8bbLlJ</latexit><latexit sha1_ base64="REyTb+/HkBMeGjVCLx VODiQY2Cc=">AAACY3icbVDJbh NBEG0PW3BYnMANIY0wSByCZwYh gcQliAsHDkGKE0u2sWrKNXYrvY y6ayJbo/kTrvBPfAD/QY/tA0ko qUtPr14t/fJSSc9p+rsT3bp95+ 69vfvd/QcPHz3uHRyeeVs5pCFa Zd0oB09KGhqyZEWj0hHoXNF5fvG 5rZ9fkvPSmlNelzTVsDCykAgcq FmvN9HAy7yoPzXf6/xN1sx6/XS QbiK+CbId6ItdnMwOOh8nc4uVJ sOowPtxlpY8rcGxREVNd1J5KgE vYEHjAA1o8tN6c3oTvwrMPC6sC 89wvGH/7ahBe7/WeVC2h/rrtZY 88qzBrd38f6JxxcWHaS1NWTEZ3G 4sKhWzjVtD4rl0hKzWAQA6GY6O cQkOkINtV9a1s0vWq6OFg3IpcR X+tplbJ0MfxElw3eIy+QqnNEqY VomCNoNDq7d5VlQGW+f9IFSabj fYnV039yY4ezvI0kH27V3/+OXO +D3xTLwQr0Um3otj8UWciKFAcS l+iJ/iV+dPtB8dRk+30qiz63ki rkT0/C8bbLlJ</latexit><latexit sha1_ base64="REyTb+/HkBMeGjVCLx VODiQY2Cc=">AAACY3icbVDJbh NBEG0PW3BYnMANIY0wSByCZwYh gcQliAsHDkGKE0u2sWrKNXYrvY y6ayJbo/kTrvBPfAD/QY/tA0ko qUtPr14t/fJSSc9p+rsT3bp95+ 69vfvd/QcPHz3uHRyeeVs5pCFa Zd0oB09KGhqyZEWj0hHoXNF5fvG 5rZ9fkvPSmlNelzTVsDCykAgcq FmvN9HAy7yoPzXf6/xN1sx6/XS QbiK+CbId6ItdnMwOOh8nc4uVJ sOowPtxlpY8rcGxREVNd1J5KgE vYEHjAA1o8tN6c3oTvwrMPC6sC 89wvGH/7ahBe7/WeVC2h/rrtZY 88qzBrd38f6JxxcWHaS1NWTEZ3G 4sKhWzjVtD4rl0hKzWAQA6GY6O cQkOkINtV9a1s0vWq6OFg3IpcR X+tplbJ0MfxElw3eIy+QqnNEqY VomCNoNDq7d5VlQGW+f9IFSabj fYnV039yY4ezvI0kH27V3/+OXO +D3xTLwQr0Um3otj8UWciKFAcS l+iJ/iV+dPtB8dRk+30qiz63ki rkT0/C8bbLlJ</latexit>
Lb
<latexit sha1_ base64="wzfPmAWV+iuI+eqeGz M8l7TyVj8=">AAACX3icbVBNb9 NAEN2Yj5YAJYUT4mIRkDhUsY2Q qMSlEhcOPRSpaSMlaTSejJNV98 PaHVeJLP8PrvCvOPJPWCc50JaR dvT05s3HvrxU0nOa/u5EDx4+er y3/6T79Nnzgxe9w5cX3lYOaYhW WTfKwZOShoYsWdGodAQ6V3SZX39 t65c35Ly05pzXJU01LIwsJAIH6 mqigZd5UZ82V3XezHr9dJBuIr4 Psh3oi12czQ47XyZzi5Umw6jA+ 3GWljytwbFERU13UnkqAa9hQeM ADWjy03pzdhO/D8w8LqwLz3C8Y f/tqEF7v9Z5ULZn+ru1ljzyrMG t3fx/onHFxfG0lqasmAxuNxaVit nGrRnxXDpCVusAAJ0MR8e4BAfI wbJb69rZJevV0cJBuZS4Cn/bzK 2ToQ/iJDhucZmcwjmNEqZVoqDN 4NDqbZ4VlcHWdT8IlabbDXZnd8 29Dy4+DrJ0kH3/1D95tzN+X7wR b8UHkYnP4kR8E2diKFA48UP8FL 86f6K96CDqbaVRZ9fzStyK6PVf oNC4sQ==</latexit><latexit sha1_ base64="wzfPmAWV+iuI+eqeGz M8l7TyVj8=">AAACX3icbVBNb9 NAEN2Yj5YAJYUT4mIRkDhUsY2Q qMSlEhcOPRSpaSMlaTSejJNV98 PaHVeJLP8PrvCvOPJPWCc50JaR dvT05s3HvrxU0nOa/u5EDx4+er y3/6T79Nnzgxe9w5cX3lYOaYhW WTfKwZOShoYsWdGodAQ6V3SZX39 t65c35Ly05pzXJU01LIwsJAIH6 mqigZd5UZ82V3XezHr9dJBuIr4 Psh3oi12czQ47XyZzi5Umw6jA+ 3GWljytwbFERU13UnkqAa9hQeM ADWjy03pzdhO/D8w8LqwLz3C8Y f/tqEF7v9Z5ULZn+ru1ljzyrMG t3fx/onHFxfG0lqasmAxuNxaVit nGrRnxXDpCVusAAJ0MR8e4BAfI wbJb69rZJevV0cJBuZS4Cn/bzK 2ToQ/iJDhucZmcwjmNEqZVoqDN 4NDqbZ4VlcHWdT8IlabbDXZnd8 29Dy4+DrJ0kH3/1D95tzN+X7wR b8UHkYnP4kR8E2diKFA48UP8FL 86f6K96CDqbaVRZ9fzStyK6PVf oNC4sQ==</latexit><latexit sha1_ base64="wzfPmAWV+iuI+eqeGz M8l7TyVj8=">AAACX3icbVBNb9 NAEN2Yj5YAJYUT4mIRkDhUsY2Q qMSlEhcOPRSpaSMlaTSejJNV98 PaHVeJLP8PrvCvOPJPWCc50JaR dvT05s3HvrxU0nOa/u5EDx4+er y3/6T79Nnzgxe9w5cX3lYOaYhW WTfKwZOShoYsWdGodAQ6V3SZX39 t65c35Ly05pzXJU01LIwsJAIH6 mqigZd5UZ82V3XezHr9dJBuIr4 Psh3oi12czQ47XyZzi5Umw6jA+ 3GWljytwbFERU13UnkqAa9hQeM ADWjy03pzdhO/D8w8LqwLz3C8Y f/tqEF7v9Z5ULZn+ru1ljzyrMG t3fx/onHFxfG0lqasmAxuNxaVit nGrRnxXDpCVusAAJ0MR8e4BAfI wbJb69rZJevV0cJBuZS4Cn/bzK 2ToQ/iJDhucZmcwjmNEqZVoqDN 4NDqbZ4VlcHWdT8IlabbDXZnd8 29Dy4+DrJ0kH3/1D95tzN+X7wR b8UHkYnP4kR8E2diKFA48UP8FL 86f6K96CDqbaVRZ9fzStyK6PVf oNC4sQ==</latexit><latexit sha1_ base64="wzfPmAWV+iuI+eqeGz M8l7TyVj8=">AAACX3icbVBNb9 NAEN2Yj5YAJYUT4mIRkDhUsY2Q qMSlEhcOPRSpaSMlaTSejJNV98 PaHVeJLP8PrvCvOPJPWCc50JaR dvT05s3HvrxU0nOa/u5EDx4+er y3/6T79Nnzgxe9w5cX3lYOaYhW WTfKwZOShoYsWdGodAQ6V3SZX39 t65c35Ly05pzXJU01LIwsJAIH6 mqigZd5UZ82V3XezHr9dJBuIr4 Psh3oi12czQ47XyZzi5Umw6jA+ 3GWljytwbFERU13UnkqAa9hQeM ADWjy03pzdhO/D8w8LqwLz3C8Y f/tqEF7v9Z5ULZn+ru1ljzyrMG t3fx/onHFxfG0lqasmAxuNxaVit nGrRnxXDpCVusAAJ0MR8e4BAfI wbJb69rZJevV0cJBuZS4Cn/bzK 2ToQ/iJDhucZmcwjmNEqZVoqDN 4NDqbZ4VlcHWdT8IlabbDXZnd8 29Dy4+DrJ0kH3/1D95tzN+X7wR b8UHkYnP4kR8E2diKFA48UP8FL 86f6K96CDqbaVRZ9fzStyK6PVf oNC4sQ==</latexit> Lb+1
<latexit sha1_base64="IYc9W 4fy+jP8sLIq7VOu8xKcp18=">AAACY3icbVDbihNBEO2MtzXrJbv 6JsJgFASXzIwICr4s+OLDPqyw2Q0kMdRUapJm+zJ01ywJw/yJr/p PfoD/YU+SB3fXgi4Op05d+uSlkp7T9HcnunP33v0Hew+7+48eP3n aOzg897ZySEO0yrpRDp6UNDRkyYpGpSPQuaKL/PJLW7+4IuelNWe8 LmmqYWFkIRE4ULNeb6KBl3lRnzTf6/xd1sx6/XSQbiK+DbId6Itd nM4OOp8nc4uVJsOowPtxlpY8rcGxREVNd1J5KgEvYUHjAA1o8tN6 c3oTvwnMPC6sC89wvGH/7ahBe7/WeVC2h/qbtZY88qzBrd38f6Jx xcWnaS1NWTEZ3G4sKhWzjVtD4rl0hKzWAQA6GY6OcQkOkINt19a1s 0vWq6OFg3IpcRX+tplbJ0MfxElw3eIyOYEzGiVMq0RBm8Gh1ds8K yqDrfN+ECpNtxvszm6aexucvx9k6SD79qF//Hpn/J54IV6JtyITH 8Wx+CpOxVCguBI/xE/xq/Mn2o8Oo+dbadTZ9TwT1yJ6+RctE7lS</ latexit><latexit sha1_base64="IYc9W 4fy+jP8sLIq7VOu8xKcp18=">AAACY3icbVDbihNBEO2MtzXrJbv 6JsJgFASXzIwICr4s+OLDPqyw2Q0kMdRUapJm+zJ01ywJw/yJr/p PfoD/YU+SB3fXgi4Op05d+uSlkp7T9HcnunP33v0Hew+7+48eP3n aOzg897ZySEO0yrpRDp6UNDRkyYpGpSPQuaKL/PJLW7+4IuelNWe8 LmmqYWFkIRE4ULNeb6KBl3lRnzTf6/xd1sx6/XSQbiK+DbId6Itd nM4OOp8nc4uVJsOowPtxlpY8rcGxREVNd1J5KgEvYUHjAA1o8tN6 c3oTvwnMPC6sC89wvGH/7ahBe7/WeVC2h/qbtZY88qzBrd38f6Jx xcWnaS1NWTEZ3G4sKhWzjVtD4rl0hKzWAQA6GY6OcQkOkINt19a1s 0vWq6OFg3IpcRX+tplbJ0MfxElw3eIyOYEzGiVMq0RBm8Gh1ds8K yqDrfN+ECpNtxvszm6aexucvx9k6SD79qF//Hpn/J54IV6JtyITH 8Wx+CpOxVCguBI/xE/xq/Mn2o8Oo+dbadTZ9TwT1yJ6+RctE7lS</ latexit><latexit sha1_base64="IYc9W 4fy+jP8sLIq7VOu8xKcp18=">AAACY3icbVDbihNBEO2MtzXrJbv 6JsJgFASXzIwICr4s+OLDPqyw2Q0kMdRUapJm+zJ01ywJw/yJr/p PfoD/YU+SB3fXgi4Op05d+uSlkp7T9HcnunP33v0Hew+7+48eP3n aOzg897ZySEO0yrpRDp6UNDRkyYpGpSPQuaKL/PJLW7+4IuelNWe8 LmmqYWFkIRE4ULNeb6KBl3lRnzTf6/xd1sx6/XSQbiK+DbId6Itd nM4OOp8nc4uVJsOowPtxlpY8rcGxREVNd1J5KgEvYUHjAA1o8tN6 c3oTvwnMPC6sC89wvGH/7ahBe7/WeVC2h/qbtZY88qzBrd38f6Jx xcWnaS1NWTEZ3G4sKhWzjVtD4rl0hKzWAQA6GY6OcQkOkINt19a1s 0vWq6OFg3IpcRX+tplbJ0MfxElw3eIyOYEzGiVMq0RBm8Gh1ds8K yqDrfN+ECpNtxvszm6aexucvx9k6SD79qF//Hpn/J54IV6JtyITH 8Wx+CpOxVCguBI/xE/xq/Mn2o8Oo+dbadTZ9TwT1yJ6+RctE7lS</ latexit><latexit sha1_base64="IYc9W 4fy+jP8sLIq7VOu8xKcp18=">AAACY3icbVDbihNBEO2MtzXrJbv 6JsJgFASXzIwICr4s+OLDPqyw2Q0kMdRUapJm+zJ01ywJw/yJr/p PfoD/YU+SB3fXgi4Op05d+uSlkp7T9HcnunP33v0Hew+7+48eP3n aOzg897ZySEO0yrpRDp6UNDRkyYpGpSPQuaKL/PJLW7+4IuelNWe8 LmmqYWFkIRE4ULNeb6KBl3lRnzTf6/xd1sx6/XSQbiK+DbId6Itd nM4OOp8nc4uVJsOowPtxlpY8rcGxREVNd1J5KgEvYUHjAA1o8tN6 c3oTvwnMPC6sC89wvGH/7ahBe7/WeVC2h/qbtZY88qzBrd38f6Jx xcWnaS1NWTEZ3G4sKhWzjVtD4rl0hKzWAQA6GY6OcQkOkINt19a1s 0vWq6OFg3IpcRX+tplbJ0MfxElw3eIyOYEzGiVMq0RBm8Gh1ds8K yqDrfN+ECpNtxvszm6aexucvx9k6SD79qF//Hpn/J54IV6JtyITH 8Wx+CpOxVCguBI/xE/xq/Mn2o8Oo+dbadTZ9TwT1yJ6+RctE7lS</ latexit>
Wb
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Fig. 2. Illustration of oracle-assisted coding scheme. In every sub-block b, uniformly random bits Ab (represented as vertical bars) are transmitted using a
layered secrecy code. At the end of sub-block b transmission, an oracle indicates to the legitimate parties which bits were unreliable (white stripes) and secret
(gray stripes). Unreliable bits are repeated in the next sub-block while reliable secret bits are used to one-time pad a message Wb+1 in sub-block b + 1.
Additional uniformly random bits Lb+1 are appended to form Ab+1.
Let both the encoder and the decoder have access to a common sequence of mutually independent random functions F 1, · · · , FB
from {0, 1}k to Xn where for all a ∈ {0, 1}k and b ∈ J1, BK, F b(a) is distributed according to P ⊗nX . In the sub-block b, the
transmitter prepares k , d(Imax + 2ζ)n + 1e bits Ab = (Ab1, · · · , Abk) defined as follows. Let A01 = A02 = · · · = A0k , 0,
αb , α(sb), and
mb ,
{







b ∈ J2, BK (72)
ub ,
{







b ∈ J2, B + 1K . (73)
By Lemma 2, mb represents the number of secure bits in the sub-block b − 1 that can be used as a key in sub-block b; by
Lemma 4, 2u
b
is almost the size of the list required for correct list-decoding in the sub-block b−1. We repeat ub bits of Ab−1
in Ab to form Ab as
Abκ ,

Ab−1κ κ ∈ J1, ubK
Ab−1κ ⊕W bκ κ ∈ Jub + 1,mbK
Lbκ κ ∈ Jmax(mb, ub) + 1, kK . (74)
Note that if mb < ub + 1, the set Jub + 1,mbK is empty and no message bit is transmitted in the sub-block b. Finally, after
transmission of sub-block B, we use an AVC code to transmit AB+1 , (AB1 , · · · , ABuB+1). The existence of AVC codes is
established in the following lemma.
Lemma 5. Suppose for the AVC (X × S,WY|XS ,Y), we have minα∈[0,1] IαY > 0. Then, there exists R > 0, ξ > 0, and a
sequence of codes with common randomness {CAVCm }m>1 such that Cm transmits a message in J1, b2mRcK over m channel
uses with vanishing probability of error AVCm 6 2−ξm.
Proof. See [38, Lemma 12.10].
In particular, if m = Θ(n), we can transmit AB+1 by CAVCm .
Decoding: The decoder operates recursively to decode AB+1,AB , · · · ,A1 in this order. First, using the decoder of CAVCm ,
the receiver recovers AB+1 as ÂB+1. Subsequently, for the sub-block b ∈ J1, BK, we assume that an estimate Âb+1 of Ab+1
is available at the receiver. The receiver forms a list Lb , φ[ν, F b, `b](Yb) with ν(x,y) , I(x ∧ y) and










where φ[ν, F b, `b] is defined in Definition 2. Then, the receiver seeks a sequence a ∈ Lb such that for all κ ∈ J1, ub+1K we
have aκ = Âb+1κ . If there is a unique such sequence, the decoder sets Â
b , a; otherwise, it declares an error. The message
bits W bκ can finally be decoded from Â
1, · · · , ÂB .
Reliability Analysis: The probability of error is upper-bounded by
P
(

















Ab 6= Âb∣∣Ab+1 = Âb+1, · · · ,AB+1 = ÂB+1). (77)




6 AVCm by construction. For the sub-block b ∈ J1, BK, let
Ab , {Ab}, (78)
Bb , {a ∈ {0, 1}k : for all κ ∈ J1, ub+1K we have aκ = Ab+1κ }, (79)
which are the set of the transmitted message in the sub-block b, and the set of all messages matching with the bits of the next
sub-block, respectively. With these notations, we can write the probability of decoding error in the sub-block b as
P
(
Ab 6= Âb∣∣Ab+1 = Âb+1, · · · ,AB+1 = ÂB+1) = P(Lb ∩ Bb 6= Ab) (80)
6 P
(Ab * Lb)+ P((Lb ∩ Bb) \ Ab 6= ∅) (81)
By Lemma 4, there exists some ξ > 0 such that P
(Ab * Ln) 6 2−ξn. To upper-bound the second term on the RHS of (81),
let 0 denote the all-zero vector, and note that
P







((Lb ∩ Bb) \ Ab 6= ∅∣∣Ab = a) (82)
(a)
= P
((Lb ∩ Bb) \ Ab 6= ∅∣∣Ab = 0), (83)
where (a) follows since our encoding and decoding processes are symmetric with respect to all messages. Furthermore, when
Ab = 0, we have Ab = {0} and Bb = {a : for all κ ∈ J1, ub+1K aκ = 0}. Therefore, by the union bound, we have
P
((Lb ∩ Bb) \ Ab 6= ∅∣∣Ab = 0) 6 ∑
a˜: for all κ∈J1,ub+1K aκ=0,a˜6=0
P
(



























Secrecy Analysis: Let Zb denote the adversary’s observation in the sub-block b ∈ J1, BK, ZB+1 denote what the adversary
observes during the transmission of AB+1, and
Wb , (W bκ : k ∈ J1, kK), (88)
Lb , (Lbk : κ ∈ Jmax(mb, ub) + 1, kK) (89)
A
b , (Abκ : κ ∈ J1,mb+1K) (90)
A˜b , (Abκ : κ ∈ Jmb+1 + 1, kK). (91)
The functional dependence graph illustrating the dependencies introduced by the chaining in (74) and with the notation in (88)-
(91) is shown in Fig. 3. Our objective is to upper-bound
I
(
W1, · · · ,WB ;Z1, · · · ,ZB+1|F 1 = f1, · · · , FB = fB) (92)




;Zb|F b = f b
)
6 2−ξn which holds with high probability by
construction of the layered scheme and the definition of A
b
. From now on, all expressions should be interpreted as conditioned
on F 1 = f1, · · · , FB = fB for such f1, · · · , fB ; we will omit F 1 = f1, · · · , FB = fB from our notation for the sake of
simplicity. We shall first prove the following auxiliary lemma.
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Fig. 3. Functional dependence graph illustrating chaining in (74) for the variables in (88)-(91)
Lemma 6. For all b ∈ J1, BK, we have I(Ab;Z1, · · · ,Zb) 6 b2−ξn.






6 2−ξn. We use induction on b to prove




;Z1, · · · ,Zb−1
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;Z1, · · · ,Zb−1|Zb
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(93)




;Z1, · · · ,Zb−1|Zb
)
(94)

















where (a) follows from the Markov chain (Zb,A
b
) − Ab−1 − (Z1, · · · ,Zb−1) as seen in Fig. 3, and (b) follows from the
induction hypothesis.
We now resume the proof of the secrecy of the scheme. By the chain rule, we have
I
(




Wb;Z1, · · · ,ZB+1|Wb+1, · · · ,WB). (98)
Considering each term in the above expression separately, we have
I
(




Wb;Z1, · · · ,Zb−1|Ab) (100)
6 I
(



















where (a) follows from the independence of (Wb+1, · · · ,WB ,Ab) and Wb (it holds because the bits of Ab that depend on
Wb are XOR of Wb and bits of Ab−1 which are independent of Wb), (b) follows form the Markov chain
(Wb+1, · · · ,WB ,Zb, · · · ,ZB+1)−Ab − (Wb,Z1, · · · ,Zb−1), (105)
(c) follows since there is a one-to-one mapping between (Wb,Ab) and (Wb,A
b−1
,Lb), (d) follows from the Markov chain
(Wb,Lb)−Ab−1 − (Z1, · · · ,Zb−1), (106)
and (e) follows from Lemma 6. Combining (98) and (104), we obtain
I
(
W1, · · · ,WB ;Z1, · · · ,ZB+1) 6 B22−ξn. (107)
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Rate Analysis: Note that the rate is not random here since the number of information bits is fixed. We know that the bits















































where (a) follows from the convexity of IαY in α and the linearity of IαZ in α.
With an appropriate choice of the parameters of the oracle-assisted scheme, we obtain the following.
Corollary 1. Fix ζ > 0 and PX . There exists ξ > 0 and a sequence of (N,KN , dN 23 e) oracle-assisted coding schemes
{CN = (fN , φN , ψN , ψ̂N , QN )}N>1 such that for all {sN}N>1 with limN→∞ α(sN ) = α and N large enough
ψN
N






















Proof. For a fixed N , consider an oracle-assisted scheme, CN , with n = dN 23 e and B = bN 13 c − O(1) which operates as
described above. Note that the common randomness QN consists of F 1, · · · , FB and the common randomness required for
CAVCm . Since the probability of error is upper-bounded by B(2−nζ + 2−nξ + AV Cm , m = Θ(n), and n > N
2
3 , for ξ small
enough, we have Pe(CN |sN ) 6 2−ξN
2
3 . Additionally, Lemma 2 together with union bound imply that with probability at least
1−B2−ξN
2
3 for all b ∈ J1, BK, we have I(Ab;Zb) 6 2−ξN 23 . Therefore, by our secrecy analysis in this section, we have
PQN
(















. Note that in our analysis, we did not take into the
account the portion of sN which corresponds to the use of CAVCm , since it does not change limN→∞ α(sN ); we will use this
simplification several times in the later proofs.
D. Estimation of Adversary’s Actions
In this section, we consider an (N,K, n) oracle-assisted coding scheme introduced in Section III-C and modify it to
construct a regular coding scheme which does not require the oracle. The main idea is to select some positions in each
sub-block at random and transmit a fixed symbol in those positions. Using the feedback channel WX|XS , the transmitter
then estimates the weight of the channel states provided that the length of the sub-block is large enough. Formally, let the
new sub-block length be n′ = n + t for t specified later; At the beginning of every sub-block b ∈ J1, BK, the transmitter
selects t distinct positions Jb , (Jb1 , · · · , Jbt ) with Jb1 < · · · < Jbt uniformly at random out of n′ positions, in which the
transmitter sends a fixed symbol x0 ∈ X with WX|X=x0S=0 6= WX|X=x0S=1, which always exists by our assumption that
WX|XS=0 6= WX|XS=1. The encoder operates according to the sub-block b of the oracle-assisted scheme in the remaining
n positions. Since WX|X=x0S=0 6= WX|X=x0S=1, there exists x0 ∈ X with WX|XS(x0|x0, 1) 6= WX|XS(x0|x0, 0). For
simplicity, let p0 ,WX|XS(x0|x0, 0) and p1 ,WX|XS(x0|x0, 1). We also define

















p1 − p0 . (118)
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In other words, αb is the overall fraction of ones in the state sequence of the sub-block b, αb is the fraction of ones in the
state sequence corresponding to the positions used for transmission, and α̂b is our estimation of αb. Each α̂b takes t + 1
possible values by definition. Note that in the protocol described in Section III-C, the parameters depending on α1, · · · , αB
are m1, · · · ,mB , u1, · · · , uB , and `1, · · · , `B . In the modified protocol, we substitute them with the approximations
m̂b ,
{







b ∈ J2, BK (119)
ûb ,
{







b ∈ J2, B + 1K (120)
log ̂`b , k − ⌈(Iα̂bY − 2ζ)n⌉ (121)
After the Bth sub-block, the transmitter sends the positions J1, · · · ,JB together with α̂1, · · · , α̂B using the AVC code CAVCm
for m = O(Bt log(Bt) +B log t). To analyze the secrecy and reliability of the modified coding scheme, we first prove that,
with high probability, m̂b, ûb, and ̂`b properly estimate mb, ub, and `b, where we redefined mb, ub, `b with the modified
version of αb as
mb ,
{







b ∈ J2, BK (122)
ub ,
{







b ∈ J2, B + 1K (123)









We recall that all mb, m̂b, ub, ûb, `b, and ̂`b are random variables, but for simplicity and with slightly abusing our notation,
we use small letters to represent them. Notice that we should be careful not to overestimate mb to remain secure and not to
underestimate ub to remain reliable.
Lemma 7. For tn small enough, there exists some ξ > 0 such that
P
(
m̂b 6 mb and ûb > ub and ̂`b > `b) > 1− 2−tξ. (125)
Proof. We first show that for all  > 0,
P










To prove this, notice that
P







(|α̂b−1 − αb−1| > |Jb−1 = j). (127)
To upper-bound the above summation, we split it into two terms. First, if we define
E ,
{
























Jb−1 ∈ E). (130)
To upper-bound P
(
Jb−1 ∈ E), we express this probability in terms of the Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) of a
random variable with hypergeometric distribution. Let H shows the number of successes in t draws without replacement from
a population of size n′ with exactly wt(sb−1) successes in the population. Then, we have
P
(
Jb−1 ∈ E) = P(∣∣∣∣H − twt(sb−1)n′












where (a) follows from standard tail bounds for hypergeometric distribution (e.g., see [40]). We now fix a j = (j1, · · · , jt) /∈ E









p1 − p0 . (133)
We know that
E(Ti) = sb−1ji (134)
−p0
p1 − p0 6 Ti 6
1− p0
p1 − p0 . (135)
Hence, by Hoeffding’s inequality, we obtain
P
































































where (a) follows since j /∈ E . Therefore, combining (127), (129), and (140), we obtain
P


















































































(|αb−1 − α̂b−1| 6 ζ2) (145)
= P
(|αb−1 − αb−1 − α̂b−1 + αb−1| 6 ζ2) (146)
> P




























> 1− 2 exp
(



























> 1− 2−ξt and P
(̂`b > `b) > 1− 2−ξt, which completes the proof of lemma.
Now for all b ∈ J1, BK, we fix some values for m̂b, ûb, ̂`b, Jb denoted by m˜b, u˜b, ˜`b, j˜b. Conditioned on these fixed
values, we can omit the adversary’s observations in the positions used for estimation from secrecy analysis because they
only depend on the noise of the channel. Since conditioned on the positions selected for estimation, the estimated values
are independent from all other sources of randomness, the probability of error and mutual information between the message
and adversary’s observations are the same as those of the coding scheme of Section III-C when it operates on the positions
selected for transmission and m˜b, u˜b, ˜`b are used in the scheme. Note that after conditioning, the variables mb, ub, `b defined
in (122)-(124) are fixed. Thus, we can define the set
A , {(m˜1, · · · , m˜B , u˜1, · · · , u˜B , ˜`1, · · · , ˜`B , j˜1, · · · , j˜B) : for all b, mb 6 m˜b, ub > u˜b, ̂`b 6 ˜`b}. (152)





for all b, m̂b = m˜b, ûb = u˜b, ̂`b = ˜`b,Jb = j˜b) (153)
P
(







for all b, m̂b = m˜b, ûb = u˜b, ̂`b = ˜`b,Jb = j˜b) (155)
P
(





where the first summation is taken over all possible values of m˜b, u˜b, ˜`b, j˜b1, · · · j˜bt for all b, (a) follows from Lemma 7, and (b)
follows from (113) and our argument that the reliability of the modified scheme is the same as the reliability of oracle-assisted
scheme under the conditioning.
For secrecy analysis, we first fix a value common randomness q such that conditioned on Q = q, the coding scheme in
Section III-C is secure. In particular, let q be such that for all state sequences s, in the coding scheme of Section III-C,
I
(




W1, · · · ,WB ;Z1, · · · ,ZB+1|Q = q)
6 I
(









for all b, m̂b = m˜b, ûb = u˜b, ̂`b = ˜`b,Jb = j˜b)
I
(






for all b, m̂b = m˜b, ûb = u˜b, ̂`b = ˜`b,Jb = j˜b)
I
(






where (a) follows from the independence of W1, · · · ,WB and m̂1, · · · , m̂B , û1, · · · , ûB , ̂`1, · · · , ̂`B ,J1, · · · ,JB . Finally,
following the same reasoning of the rate analysis in Section III-C, for α̂ , 1B
∑B
b=1 α̂
b, the rate would be greater than










Using the uniform continuity of IαY and IαZ in α and (126), for some ξ > 0, we obtain
P
(









> IαY − IαZ
)
> 1− 2−ξt. (161)
17
Corollary 2. For any ζ > 0, there exists ξ > 0 and a sequence of (N,KN ) codes {CN = (fN , φN , ψN , ψ̂N , QN )}N>1 such
that for all sequences of states {sN}N>1 with limN→∞ wt(sN )N = α and for large enough N ,
P
(
ψN (X, QN )
N
> IαY − IαZ − ζ
∣∣sN) > 1− 2−ξN 13 , (162)













Proof. For any N , let C˜N be the (N,KN ) coding scheme introduced in Corollary 1, n′ = dN 23 e, t = n′ − n =
√
n′, and
B = bN 13 c −O(1). Then, for the modified coding scheme, CN , we have for large enough N
Pe(CN |sN ) 6 2−ξN
2
3 +B2−ξt, (165)
which is less than 2−ξN
1
3 for ξ small enough. Furthermore, for large enough N and any value of common randomness q, the
information leakage conditioned on Q = q is upper-bounded by
S(CN |sN , q) 6 S(C˜N |sN , q) +B2−ξt. (166)
Substituting the value of n, B, and t and choosing ξ small enough, we have PQN
(








E. Input Distribution Selection
We have assumed so far that a fixed PMF PX is used for random coding for all sub-blocks. To achieve the secrecy capacity
of the wiretap channel, in general, channel prefixing PX|U is needed [3]. Additionally, since the capacity achieving input
distribution and the optimal prefix channel might vary for different adversary’s action, we should adapt PX according to the
feedback from adversary’s action to achieve C(α). Therefore, in each sub-block, the transmitter selects a distribution PXU
which depends on the causal information the transmitter obtained about channel states. The challenge here is that in general,
I(U ;Y ) − I(U ;Z|S) is not concave in PXU , and therefore, we follow a different approach than [26] to select the input
distribution, which is based on the results of adversarial multi-arm bandit problem [30]. Since those results cannot be applied
to an arbitrary set of “bandits”, we first introduce a technical lemma that helps us reduce the set of possible input distributions
to a finite set.
Lemma 8. Suppose A and B are compact metric spaces, and f : A × B → R is continuous. For all ζ > 0, there exists
a1, · · · , aν ∈ A such that for all b ∈ B, ∣∣∣∣ maxi∈J1,νK f(ai, b)−maxa∈A f(a, b)
∣∣∣∣ 6 ζ. (167)
Proof. Since f is continuous and its domain is a product of two compact sets, it is uniformly continuous. Thus, there exists
δ > 0 such that for all (a, b) and (a′, b′) in A × B, if d((a, b), (a′, b′)) 6 δ, then |f(a, b) − f(a′, b′)| 6 ζ. Because A is
compact, there exist a1, · · · , aν such that for all a ∈ A
min
i∈J1,νK d(ai, a) 6 δ. (168)
We now claim that a1, · · · , aν have the desired property. Consider b ∈ B. Since, A is compact, there exists a∗ ∈ A
such that f(a∗, b) = maxa∈A f(a, b). Moreover, by (168), there exists i ∈ J1, νK such that d(ai, a∗) 6 δ. We know that
d((ai, b), (a
∗, b)) 6 d(ai, a∗) 6 δ, so |f(ai, b)− f(a∗, b)| 6 ζ. This completes the proof.
We now provide a result from reinforcement learning regarding the problem of “adversarial bandit” described as follows.
Suppose for each t ∈ J1, T K, we make a choice It ∈ J1, νK. The reward for choice i at time t is denoted by gi,t ∈ [0, 1] assigned
by an adversary. Only after we made the choice at time t, we are informed about gIt,t. For a specific strategy I1, · · · , IT , we









The following lemma from [30] guarantees the existence of strategies with sub-linear regret with high probability.
Lemma 9. For all δ ∈ (0, 1), there exists I1, · · · , IT , which are possibly randomized, such that for all choices of {gi,t, i ∈J1, νK, t ∈ J1, T K}, with probability at least 1− δ, we have
R 6 5.15
√
Tν ln (νδ−1). (170)
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Proof. See [30, Theorem 3.3].
We are ready now to describe how the transmitter chooses PXU for each sub-block. For a joint PMF PXU and α ∈ [0, 1],
let PS be Bernoulli(α), (S,U,X, Y, Z) be distributed according to PSXUY Z , PSPXUWY Z|XS , and g(PXU , α) , I(U ;Y )−
I(U ;Z|S) which is continuous in its arguments. By definition, we have maxPXU g(PXU , α) = C(α). According to Lemma 8,
if we fix ζ > 0, there exist P 1XU , · · · , P νXU such that for all α ∈ [0, 1],∣∣∣∣ maxi∈J1,νK g(P iXU , α)−maxPXU g(PXU , α)
∣∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣∣ maxi∈J1,νK g(P iXU , α)− C(α)
∣∣∣∣ 6 ζ. (171)
In the sub-block b, we therefore allow the transmitter to select a distribution P I
b
XU where Ib ∈ J1, νK may depend on
α̂1, · · · , α̂b−1 defined in Section III-D and local randomness of the transmitter. By Lemma 9, we know that for all ζ > 0,









g(P iXU , α̂









> 1− 2−ξB . (172)
Using convexity of g(PXU , α) in α, for all i ∈ J1, νK, we have 1B ∑Bb=1 g(P iXU , α̂b) > g(P iXU , α̂) where α̂ , 1B ∑Bb=1 α̂b














> 1− 2−ξB . (173)
Furthermore, (171) implies that
P
(









> 1− 2−ξB . (174)
We now show that with high probability C(α̂) is close to C(α) where α , 1B
∑B
b=1 α(s
b). Continuity of C(α) in α implies















∣∣∣∣∣ > ζ ′
)
= P(|α̂− α| > ζ ′) (175)













> 1− 2−ξB . (177)





b)−O(ζ + 1B + 1n), would be at least
C(α̂)− 3ζ. At the end of the transmission, the transmitter sends I1, · · · , IB through the main channel using CAVCm introduced
in Lemma 5 for m = O(B log ν). Note that I1, · · · , IB are independent of the message bits since they depend only on
α̂1, · · · , α̂B and local randomness of the transmitter, and their transmission does not leak any information about the messages.
We summarize the results in this section as a corollary.
Corollary 3. Fix ζ > 0. There exists ξ > 0 and a sequence of (N,KN ) codes {CN = (fN , φN , ψN , ψ̂N , QN )}N>1 such that
for all {sN}N>1 with limN→∞ α(sN ) = α and N large enough
P
(
ψN (X, QN )
N
> C(α)− ζ∣∣sN) > 1− 2−ξN 13 , (178)














F. Reducing Common Randomness
In this section, we reduce the common randomness required for the coding scheme with a standard robustification argu-
ment [39]. Specifically, the following lemma is the adaptation of [38, Lemma 12.8] to our setting.
Lemma 10. Consider an (N,K) code C = (f , φ, ψ, ψ̂, Q). Let us assume that for some δ, 1, 2 > 0, and a function
R : SN → R, for all s, we have






PPQ(S(C|s, Q) > δ) 6 2, (183)
where PR(C|s, q) , P
(
ψ(X,Q)
N < R|Q = q, s
)
for R > 0. Then, for every L and  > 0 satisfying N log |S|+2 12LL2+1 < 12L










PR(s)(C|s, q`) 6 , (185)
for all `, S(C|s, q`) 6 δ. (186)
Proof. Let Q1, · · · , QL be i.i.d. according to PQ. Then, union bound yields that
P
(


































P(S(C|s, Q`) > δ)
]
. (187)

















PR(s)(C|s, Q`) > 
)
6 2−L(−log(1+1)). (189)


















< 1, which follows from
N log |S|+ 2 12LL2 + 1 < 12L.
Applying Lemma 10 on the coding schemes introduced in Corollary 3, we obtain a bound on the required amount of common
randomness .
Corollary 4. For any ζ > 0, there exists ξ > 0 and a sequence of (N,KN ) codes {CN = (fN , φN , ψN , ψ̂N , QN )}N>1 such
that for all {sN}N>1 with limN→∞ α(sN ) = α and N large enough
P
(
ψN (X, QN )
N
> C(α)− ζ∣∣sN) > 1− 1
N
, (191)
Pe(CN |sN ) 6 1
N
, (192)
for all q, S(CN |sN , q) 6 2−ξN
1
3 , (193)
H(QN ) = O(logN). (194)
Proof. Consider the sequence of codes {CN}N>1 from Corollary 3. For 1 = 2−ξN
1




,  = 1N , δ = 2
−ξN 23 ,
L = N2, all assumptions in Lemma 10 hold. Thus, we obtain a sequence of codes satisfying (191)-(194).
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IV. PROOF OF THEOREM 2: CONVERSE
Suppose {CN = (fN , φN , ψN , ψ̂N , QN )}N>1 achieves a rate R for all sequences {sN}N>1 with limN→∞ α(sN ) = α.
Let {sN}N>1 be a particular such sequence, and ΠN be a uniformly chosen random permutation on the set J1, NK that is
independent from all other sources of randomness. For a fixed N , suppose the legitimate parties use the code CN , and the
adversary applies the state sequence S˜N , (sΠN (1), · · · , sΠN (n)). Considering a random state sequence defined in such a way
allows us to upper-bound the rate of a coding scheme that operates well for all state sequences with a fixed type, although






ψN (X, QN ) 6= ψ̂N (Y, QN ) or there exists k ∈ J1, ψN (X, QN )K : Wk 6= Ŵk) = 0, (195)
lim
N→∞
I(W; ΠN ,Z) = lim
N→∞














ψN (X, QN ) > NR and for all k ∈ J1, ψN (X, QN )K : Wk = Ŵk} , (198)
which indicates whether the transmission of the first NR bits is successful, and W˜ ,
(










































−H(EN )−H(QN ) (202)
= (NR− 1)− P(EN = 0)H
(
W˜|Y, EN = 0
)
− P(EN = 1)H
(
W˜|Y, EN = 1
)
−H(EN )−H(QN ) (203)
(a)
= (NR− 1)− P(EN = 0)H
(
W˜|Y, EN = 0
)
−H(EN )−H(QN ) (204)
= (NR− 1)− P(EN = 0)NR−H(EN )−H(QN ) (205)
where (a) follows since for EN = 1, W˜ is a function of Y and QN . Moreover, if we define Z˜i , (S˜i, Zi) and Z˜ ,








6 I(W; ΠN ,Z), which is vanishing. Thus, applying [38, Lemma 17.12], we
have



























W˜; Z˜i|Y1, · · · , Yi−1, Z˜i+1, · · · , Z˜N
))
(208)
= I(VN ;YJN |UN )− I
(
VN ; Z˜JN |UN
)
, (209)
where JN is a random variable with uniform distribution on J1, NK and independent of all other random variables, UN ,
(JN , Y1, · · ·YJN−1, Z˜JN+1, · · · Z˜N ), and VN , (W˜, UN ). One can check that UN − VN − XJN − YJN Z˜JN holds; thus, we
can write the joint PMF as
PUNVNXJN YJN Z˜JN
= PUNVNXJN YJNZJN SJN (210)
= PUNVN |XJN YJNZJN SJN PYJNZJN |XJN SJN PXJN |SJN PSJN (211)
= PUN |VNPVN |XJN PYJNZJN |XJN SJN PXJN |SJN PSJN (212)
= PUN |VNPVN |XJN PYJNZJN |XJN SJN PXJN PSJN (213)
= PUN |VNPVNXJN PYJNZJN |XJN SJN PSJN (214)
= PUN |VNPVNXJNWY Z|XSPSJN . (215)
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Thus, I(VN ;YJN |UN )− I
(
VN ; Z˜JN |UN
)
6 C(α(sN )). Furthermore, we know limN→∞ P(EN = 0) = 0, and
lim
N→∞
(NR− 1)− P(EN = 0)NR−H(EN )−H(QN )− I(W; ΠN ,Z)
N
= R. (216)
Therefore, by taking the limit of both sides of (206) and using the continuity of C(α) in α, we obtain
R 6 C(α). (217)
V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
In the presence of a causal feedback channel controlled by the same states as the wiretap channel, our results show that
secrecy and reliability can be achieved as if the state sequence had been known with hindsight. We have considered binary-
state channels to simplify our notation and proofs, but all results extend to finite-state channels. Specifically, for general finite
alphabets, one should substitute the weight of states with the type of the states. Our proof then carries over nearly unchanged,
with perhaps the exception of the type estimation of the states based on the output of the feedback channel in Section III-D,
which requires some care. The result follows, for instance, if there exists a symbol for which all channel output distributions
corresponding to all states are linearly independent, so that by solving a system of linear equations, the transmitter can estimate
the type of the states.
While our model is still far from capturing the full range of active attacks that one could envision in realistic situations, it
casts a more optimistic light onto what information-theoretic security may offer in the presence of active adversaries.
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